POST COLONIALISM

In an editorial the writers of The New York Times identify errors made in Afghanistan which will be need to be fixed if the mission is to succeed.

There is no mention of capturing and putting on trial Osama bin Laden. It seems that the Taliban are the enemy. The good thing is lessons can be learned from success of smashed Iraq. When was war declared? Was the invasion and now occupation legal in terms of international law? These are not questions.

Afghanistan is grim. There will be increased violence as "the pressure is stepped up" against the enemies. American forces will not be able to be withdrawn until Afghanistan has a functioning military and police force. The dictator who will be installed must have the tools to run the place.

The first lesson: the Bush Administration never sent enough trainers to Afghanistan because of the completing demands of Iraq. One of the great successes, the editorial writer sagely notes, is that trainers have been "embedded" in the Iraqi Army, so they can keep a watch on things. The newspaper fails to observe the similar success of embedding journalists.

Another problem is that the nationalist resistance can pay their soldiers more. There is not record keeping and security of weapons, which are usually sold to anyone interested in buying them. Do the taxpayers in the United States realize that they are now expected to pay the Afghani army?

Still, we are confidently told that while now most Afghan people it is not their war but:

Perhaps most fundamentally, American war planners never seemed to understand that a more effective Afghan Army and a more honest and competent police force could help persuade civilians that the war against the Taliban was more their own fight and not just an American war being fought on their territory.

The new American general in Afghanistan has immediately taken measures "to protect Afghan people from errant air strikes" by imposing strict restrictions so that air power is only used when absolutely necessary. The murder of civilians is not a war crime, but just a mistake.

No decision has been made but the size of the Afghan Army will need to be increased to 260,000, which is twice the size proposed by the Bush Administration. Presumably, this decision will be made by Obama. We are told this will be cost effective over the next seven years:

The Pentagon estimates that it would cost $10 billion to $20 billion over a seven-year period to create and train a force that size. Paying it would cost billions more, especially if the current $100-a-month salary is to become more competitive with the $300 the Taliban pays.

The total bill would still be a lot smaller than the cost of sustaining a huge American fighting force there. By the end of this year, there will 68,000 American troops in Afghanistan, costing American taxpayers more than $60 billion a year.

Then there is the police force to be fixed:

Afghanistan’s national police force will have to be rebuilt almost from scratch. Kabul’s central government is notoriously corrupt, but the tales from the field are even more distressing. Journalists for The Times have reported seeing police officers burglarizing a home and growing opium poppies inside police compounds. American soldiers complain of police supervisors shaking down villagers, skimming subordinates’ wages and selling promotions and equipment. Muhammad Hanif Atmar, the interior minister, has pushed for greater accountability by senior police officials. He has a lot of work ahead of him.

The new man has special qualities, and things in Afghanistan are surely on the up and up:

There are high expectations for General McChrystal, based on his aggressive attitudes and past special operations success. The Taliban must be confronted head-on. To turn around the war, ordinary Afghans must begin to trust their own government more than they either fear or trust the extremists. Building an effective Afghan Army and police is critical to that effort. There is no more time to waste.

There was a time when it was not necessary to read the sub text, however explicit. The Philippines was a colony - pure and simple. In that case Manila was the entrepot for the China trade. At this time, it is not exactly clear what return Afghanistan is expected to return. I suppose the bases and the theft of the oil of Iraq justifies that criminal venture.

There is no surprise in that the lessons from Vietnam have not been drawn. The Times dare not suggest that the purpose is to keep the wars going as long as possible, since they are such great wealth transfer devices. You only have to look at Iraq, to see how much better off the people are now compared to twenty or thirty years ago. The same doubtless will be true of Afghanistan.

The generosity of the American taxpayers apparently knows no bounds. If international law was in full effect they would have more generous, especially to Iraq.






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